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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4694 
_____________ 
  
BLYTHE TOWNSHIP; FKV, LLC, 
  Appellants 
  
v. 
  
JAMES LARISH; MICHAEL PETROZINO; TOM BRENNAN; JOHN BURKE; 
VALERIA DAVIS; WILLIAM DEMPSEY; JOHN HOUSEKNECHT 
  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-13-cv-00237) 
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 16, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
  
  
Appellants claim that their due process rights were violated by the process used to review 
their land use application, and argue that the District Court erred in dismissing their 
claims sua sponte as unripe.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order of dismissal.   
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts 
essential to our discussion. 
 Blythe Township is the owner of a parcel of land in central Pennsylvania.  FKV, 
LLC is a development company.  Blythe Township and FKV (together, “Appellants”) 
intended to open a construction debris land fill.  FKV entered into a development 
agreement with Blythe Township which provided that FKV would develop, construct, 
and operate the land fill on behalf of Blythe Township.  St. Clair, a neighboring Borough, 
and members of the St. Clair Borough Council (“Appellees”) oppose the development of 
a land fill on this specific parcel of land.   
 Appellants contend that representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) initially approved Appellants’ 
environmental assessment permit.  DEP, however, did not inform Appellants of its 
approval.  In the meantime, Appellees allegedly had “secret meetings” with DEP to 
reverse its initial approval of Appellants’ environmental assessment permit.  DEP 
reversed its approval, forcing Appellants to appeal to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
Environmental Hearing Board.   
  
 Ultimately, the DEP granted a permit to Appellants to begin construction of the 
land fill.  Appellees immediately appealed this decision to the Environmental Hearing 
Board.  The appeal is pending.   
 Meanwhile, Appellants filed a thirty-two count complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, alleging that Appellees deprived Appellants of due process in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  State law tortious interference with contract and prospective 
contract claims are also asserted.  The Appellees joined DEP in a third-party complaint 
alleging that DEP conspired with Appellees to violate Appellants’ due process rights.   
 The District Court dismissed Appellants’ federal claims on ripeness grounds sua 
sponte.  This appeal followed.   
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s dismissal 
on the grounds of ripeness is plenary.  Taylor Inv. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 
1289 (3d Cir. 1993).  In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept all 
allegations of the complaint as true, attribute all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff, and affirm only if it appears that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that 
would entitle it to relief.  Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Nami 
v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)).   
III. Analysis 
 On appeal, Appellants urge that the matter is ripe for review because Appellees 
  
have caused harms to Appellants through lost profits and costs associated with the delay 
of construction of the land fill.  The District Court reasoned that because the 
Environmental Hearing Board was still deciding the issue of the permit, this case was not 
ripe.  Specifically, the District Court reasoned that if the Environmental Hearing Board 
denied Appellees’ appeal and approved Appellants’ permit, Appellants’ due process 
claims would be rendered moot.   
 “The ripeness doctrine serves ‘to determine whether a party has brought an action 
prematurely and counsels abstention until such time as a dispute is sufficiently concrete 
to satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of the doctrine.’”  Khodara 
Envtl., Inc. v. Blakey, 376 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Peachlum v. City of 
York, 333 F.3d 429, 422 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Part of our analysis requires us to assess 
whether there is a final ruling that is judicially reviewable.  “The ripeness doctrine 
prevents judicial interference ‘until an administrative decision has been formalized and 
its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’”  Lauderbaugh v. Hopewell 
Twp., 319 F.3d 568, 575 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 149 (1967)).  Thus, the finality rule allows a suit whenever a “decisionmaker has 
arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury[.]”  
Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985).   
 Appellants argue that Appellees, as a governmental actor, have come to the 
“definitive” position of “stopping, delaying and preventing the construction of [the land 
fill].”  (Appellants’ Br. 14).  This argument, however, is based on the mistaken belief that 
  
the definitive action that matters in this case is that of Appellees.  As the District Court 
noted, it is the definitive action of the Environmental Hearing Board that is still pending.  
This fact renders Appellants’ case unripe.   
 Permitting the Environmental Hearing Board to reach a final determination on the 
permit issue may resolve the constitutional issues that Appellants allege.  For example, it 
is not apparent that Blythe Township has suffered a constitutional injury through the 
delay of receiving their permit.  We have stressed “the importance of the finality 
requirement and our reluctance to allow the courts to become super land-use boards of 
appeals.  Land-use decisions concern a variety of interests and person, and local 
authorities are in a better position than the courts to assess the burdens and benefits of 
those varying interests.”  Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 
598 (3d Cir. 1998).   
 Finally, it is not clear from the record that the actions of Appellees will fall outside 
the statute of limitations if Appellants are forced to wait until the Environmental Hearing 
Board reaches a decision.  The motion was dismissed without prejudice.  Appellees will 
have another opportunity to bring any due process claims against Appellants once the 
agency’s appellate process is final.   
IV. Conclusion 
 Because Appellants’ claims are not yet ripe for review, we will affirm the 
November 25, 2013 order of the District Court dismissing Appellants’ complaint.   
